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Abstract
This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure con-
tracts. We focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government
purchasers of infrastructure services by the supplying companies and by
the governments themselves. In particular, we allow for trust misalign-
ments which may give rise to undertrusting and overtrusting. The core
of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts which we use
to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic e¢ciency
(measured by expected welfare) and on investment levels. We explore ex-
ible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do
not allow for post-investment renegotiation) and hybrid contracts. We
then compare the e¢ciency of the exible contracts to that of hybrid
contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare implications of each
contract. The model is used to shed light on current issues on the sus-
tainability of private investment infrastructure contracts in developed and
in developing countries.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate trust issues in infrastructure contracts, the viabil-
ity of such contracts and the role of regulation and institutions in general in
a¤ecting these contracts1 . More specically, we focus on how well aligned are
trust perceptions between buyers and sellers of infrastructure services, as well
as on absolute levels of trust. It turns out from our analysis, that the mutual
alignment and evolution of trust perceptions are both of major importance. In-
frastructure assets are very long-lived, sunk assets and the services that they
provide are typically highly politically sensitive (electricity, water, transport,
etc.). In consequence, the critical issue for e¤ective and sustained delivery is
how to ensure adequate trust between the supplying entity and the government
which is purchasing the output and providing the legal underpinnings, including
possible regulatory arrangements. These issues are always important for private
infrastructure investment in general, but are particularly important, rstly, for
riskier investments; and, secondly, for infrastructure investment in di¢cult in-
stitutional environments as are frequently found in developing and transition
countries.
A wide range of institutional arrangements is observed in practice to sup-
port private investment in infrastructure. This range includes, at one extreme
licensed suppliers operating on innite length contracts supervised by a regula-
tor (classic electricity, water and telecom regulation) through to, at the other
end of the spectrum, xed length concession contracts with no external supervi-
sory body other than the courts (e.g. many toll road contracts). There are also
many hybrid models which combine contracts with regulatory or other forms
of external regulation/arbitration etc. in various ways (e.g. UK railways, the
London Underground and many others). As argued later, contracts and regu-
lation are better regarded as complements rather than substitutes2 . It is worth
pointing out that infrastructure contracts  like long-term contracts between
companies - can be found with various degrees of external contract resolution
and with varying degrees of renegotiating exibility both in terms of tari¤ and
similar changes and for post-investment renegotiation3 .
In this paper, we explicitly introduce a measure for the quality of the in-
stitutional and regulatory conditions that prevail in the environment where the
contract is to be implemented. This is a variable that covers the aspects of
country governance that most directly impact on the likelihood that the con-
tract will be fairly administered and enforced and that any contract disputes
1Contracts in our paper refer to legally binding agreements that involve investment as
well as operation and management. This includes all concession contracts with investments
as well as US innite duration franchises, but excludes French aftermage contracts. It also
excludes PPPs except for those where there is a regulatory entity in place (like the London
Underground PPPs).
2See Stern (2003), Bolt (2003 and 2007). These both discuss the issues arising from the
perspective of a regulated industry. Athias and Saussier (2006) discuss these issues arising
from the perspective of concession contract design.
3See Athias and Saussier (2006) for evidence on this for toll road concessions and Menard
and Saussier (2002) for water supply arrangements.
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will be resolved in an impartial manner. Apart from the presence of a regulator,
this most obviously concerns issues to do with the rule of law, the reliability and
timeliness of law courts, and levels of probity (and corruption) in public life4 .
We present and report the results of a game theoretic model which includes
not just the contract and the relevant institutional framework, but also the po-
tential for renegotiation (including regulatory review). Hence, following Menard
and Saussier (2002), we consider the relative merits of di¤erent types of contrac-
tual arrangements. In addition, we explicitly consider the role of term revision
and renegotiation clauses, following the evidence of Athias and Saussier (2006)
on the way that they are used (and not used) in toll road concession contracts.
We adopt a game theoretic approach to these issues starting from a consid-
eration of alternative types of contract. We rst develop a typology of contracts
building on Athias and Saussier who distinguished between:
(a) Flexible contracts, which explicitly allow for contract renegotiations after
investments have been made; and
(b) Rigid contracts, which set xed contract terms before the investments
are made and do not allow for subsequent term changes or renegotiation.
We then develop hybrid models which are constructed by introducing a vari-
able for the probability of renegotiating a xed contract after the investment
has taken place. We integrate the discussion of contracts with that of regulation
on the basis that external regulators can allow simpler contracts, easier dispute
resolution and, in particular, more readily agreed contract renegotiation. This
perspective arises from La¤ont (2005), Guasch and Straub (2006) as well as
Stern (2003).
The measure of trustworthiness on which we focus is the probability that
the contract between the buyer and the seller will be enforced, taking the sim-
plest dimension of enforcement, i.e. that of the buyer paying the rm. Hence
the probability for dishonest behaviour exists from the side of the seller. We
explore a range of contractual and institutional arrangements that can reduce
this perception gap and/or help guarantee payment. These may take a vari-
ety of forms from (a) insurance type of arrangements (for example World Bank
guarantees against regulatory risk) to (b) some form of explicit pre-payment
contracts (see, for instance, Braynov and Sandholm, 2002). Essentially in our
model, the term prepayment is interpreted broadly and can mean any facility
that provides an almost as good as in your pocket money to the buyer and/or
the seller.
The paper sets out the formal modeling relationship between trust percep-
tions and di¤erent contractual arrangements. A bargaining model between the
4Specialist regulatory or similar external agencies may be given some of the responsibilities
for these issues, but within a legal framework under which appeals and possibly implementa-
tion would be done by the local courts. Of course, countries may decide to establish indepen-
dent regulatory or similar agencies as a way of signalling to investors their commitment to
fair dealing on infrastructure contracts and investment. Such policy signalling devices were
advocated by the World Bank and others in the 1990s but actually go back to medieval times
for trade courts, as shown in Greif (2006).
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buyer and the seller is developed using a framework based on Nash bargaining.
We compare the expected welfare in each of these models with those from an
incentive-compatible benchmark contract and use these expected welfare com-
parisons to evaluate the appropriateness in di¤erent circumstances of di¤erent
contract forms, or external regulator and pre-payment/guarantee arrangements.
In section 2 we address the question of whether concession contracts are
substitutes or complements. This is followed by section 3 where the framework
for our model is set out. We attempt to tackle the problem of misalignment
of trust perceptions regarding the buyer by using alternative forms of exible
contracts, followed by an analysis of rigid contracts. Then the welfare implica-
tions of rigid contracts with no commitment not to renegotiate are compared to
those of exible contracts. In section 4 the issue of trust and trust perceptions
is discussed in more depth in the light of the results derived from the model in
section 3. Finally, we draw our conclusions in section 5.
2 CONCESSION CONTRACTS AND REGU-
LATION: SUBSTITUTES ORCOMPLEMENTS?
From around the mid-1980s, there was a strong push towards developing regu-
latory agencies as the key way in which trust could be established for countries
privatising their utilities or wishing to expand private investment. This policy
was heavily inuenced by developments in the 1980s in the UK and in Chile
as well as some other countries. Indeed, World Bank policy advice suggested
that for developing countries, establishing an independent regulator would sig-
nal that they were trustworthy for supporting private investment (including
allowing a reasonable rate of return). Hence, it was suggested that establishing
such agencies was a way of assuring infrastructure investors that countries were
now trustworthy i.e. eliminating the undertrusting problem.
Proponents of this view failed to give su¢cient weight to:
(i) the degree to which governments would intervene into regulatory deci-
sions;
(ii) the degree to which regulatory laws and institutions provided discre-
tionary powers (which enabled governments to intervene arbitrarily); and
(iii) the time it takes to establish regulators and the volume of specialist
resources required.
In consequence, by the late 1990s, the optimistic view of regulators was seri-
ously battered by major regulatory failures, in particular after the Asian nan-
cial crisis in 1997-98 when new regulators were e¤ectively discarded and many
investments (or at least debt contracts for the investments) became unviable.
Spiller (2004) argues that concession contracts provide individualized regu-
lation with contracts that are rigid by origin rather than relational as typically
found in long-term contracts between private sector entities.
The problem with this argument is that, as is now well-known, tight contracts
are very brittle in the face of shocks and renegotiation can be di¢cult. Renego-
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tiation rates are typically very high for developing country concession contracts
- particularly for toll road and water concessions which Guasch (2004) report
at (respectively) 55% and 74% for Latin America over the period 1989-2000.
Of course, far from all renegotiations lead to project collapse. Nevertheless,
according to the World Bank PPI database, over the period 1990-2004, 160 in-
frastructure projects accounting for 9% of investment ows were canceled or in
distress. For water, 7% of projects accounting for 37% of investment ows in
the sector were canceled or became distressed, i.e. a disproportionate number
of high value concession projects.
The counter-argument to the case for rigid contracts in Stern (2005) is that,
where country governance is su¢ciently supportive, trust is better achieved for
infrastructure investment by establishing a separate regulatory entity, which
has been assigned legal powers to act of its own volition. This agency has
the authority, in consultation with regulated companies and their consumers,
to modify existing regulatory obligations (for example, tari¤s and quality of
service) and to establish new regulatory rights and obligations. In particular,
it has the right to review and revise regulatory obligations according to some
dened process. Hence, it operates as a full regulator, including a degree of
bounded and accountable discretion.
Such a mechanism provides a way in which contracts can be reappraised
and revised in the light of changing circumstances according to a pre-agreed
and impartial process. Hence it allows simpler and more transparent initial
contracts and better enforcement. Of course, although regulators may behave
in the way recommended, there is no guarantee that they will actually do so.
Hence, the search for other mechanisms to help establish regulatory capacity
and reputation like initial regulatory risk guarantees, etc. to help underpin
agreements and induce more trust earlier i.e. what we have described as pre-
payment agreements.
In many cases contracts without external regulatory support will at best
require major renegotiation and in many cases will fail. However, there are also
cases where contracts with little or no regulatory support may well be su¢cient.
The di¤erence depends rstly on the nature of the contracted service and its
associated investment (e.g. whether it is a straightforward and/or previously
successfully delivered investment); and, secondly, on the degree of trust between
the purchaser and the seller and/or on whether the parties do or do not have
a previous history of successfully managing such contracts. We discuss this
further with examples in the next section and again in section 4 following the
results from our bargaining model.
In the model we introduce the concepts of undertrusting and overtrusting.
These can be understood as follows:
Consider the typical case where the government is the buyer of infrastructure
services via some type of long duration contract or equivalent5 and the seller
is a private company, typically an infrastructure company. We dene "under-
5A xed period UK-style infrastructure regulatory licence and an innite US utility autho-
risation would both be included in this categorisation.
5
trusting" as the case where the selling rms belief that the buyer will honour
the contract is less than the buyer himself perceives it to be. Similarly we
dene as "overtrusting" the case where sellers estimate that it will receive full
payment under the contract is higher than the buyer believes it to be.
With undertrusting, the key problem is how to motivate and sustain ongoing
and agreed levels of investment in the face of unforeseen developments and
incomplete contracts. Conversely with overtrusting, the key problem is whether
or not companies, having made particular investments, will receive payments
that they think they are owed under the contract when unanticipated changes
are needed and/or unforeseen developments occur. Hence, one would expect
contracts with undertrusting to break down relatively slowly but contracts with
overtrusting to collapse rapidly.
Trust alignment occurs when the beliefs of the seller and buyer are the
same. Of course, this may be at a high level of trust (as in countries in the
top 5% of country governance scores) or at a very low level of trust (as in
countries with very low country governance scores). In what follows, we show
that, while the best outcome  particularly for consumers  involves contracts
at high levels of mutual trust; infrastructure contracts involving quite large
amounts of privately nanced investment may be sustainable in circumstances
of low trust (e.g. Paraguay in the 1960s and 70s, some central African states),
even if highly suboptimal.
Note that this paper is primarily concerned with expected welfare compar-
isons arising from perceived trust variations of the buyer government. In conse-
quence, we consider neither (a) government beliefs of the trustworthiness of the
seller; nor (b) issues arising because a corrupted buyer government may not be
interested in expected welfare. We leave these for subsequent work.
Similar trust and trust perception issues exist over the commitment of the
seller (i.e. the infrastructure company). We do not explicitly discuss such issues
in what follows but the analysis should be similar, albeit this time referring to
the probability of investment rather than the probability of full payment. We
leave this for future research - as well as combining buyer and seller trust and
trust perception issues.
3 THE MODEL
The model draws on game-theoretic bargaining models that have been devel-
oped in related contexts. In particular, we draw attention to McMillan and
Waxman (2007) which explores the importance of trust in terms of the way it
inuences the bargaining power of governments and multi-national companies.
We also draw attention to the paper by Braynov and Sandholm (2002) which
has a technical discussion of how trust can be integrated and dealt within dif-
ferent types of Nash bargaining solution modelling environments. The general
issue of government and company reputation in infrastructure concession con-
tracts is discussed in Guasch and Straub (2006) paper on concession contract
renegotiation.
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Weakness in contract enforcement is one of the main reasons why developing
countries generally nd it more di¢cult to attract both international trade as
well as infrastructure investment. The dynamic process by which rms engaged
in international trade build trustworthiness because contracts are not completely
enforceable, is discussed in Araujo and Ornelas (2007) regarding short term
international trade contracts. Baraynov and Sandholm discuss contracting with
uncertain levels of trust in a static model and the importance of the extent
to which the sellers trust equals the buyers actual trustworthiness. We do
combine both of these characteristics in this paper.
The institutional environment
We dene an institutional parameter  2 [0; 1] that measures the countrys
ability to enforce concession contracts. This measure can simply be the propor-
tion of contracts that a legal system enforces as Anderson and Young (2006)
suggest, or can also include other parameters in a countrys institutional set up
such as the degree of international indebtedness of the country concerned. Al-
ternatively it can be considered as an indicator of the probability that contract
violations will be detected and punished, as well as whether or not there are ef-
fective adjudicating procedures for disputes. Finally the value of  may be also
determined by whether or not there is some type of external regulatory agency
in place, including agencies whose role is to monitor and enforce such contracts,
or an external body arbitration agency/facility. The e¢ciency of such a body
will determine how close  is to one:
Trustworthiness beliefs held by the rm
Imperfect contract enforcement coupled with opportunistic behaviour by the
host government and the presence of very large sunk costs typically found in the
majority of infrastructure contracts means that all three factors for substantial
transactions costs are present. These factors may prevent such contracts from
happening in the rst place. On the other hand, the more the government abides
by the terms of a contract the more convinced the investing rm becomes of the
trustworthiness of the purchasing government.
a0 is the selling rms belief that the government will honour the terms of
the contract and that it will be paid on delivering the product or service of
the contract on the terms stipulated in the contract. There is little theoretical
analysis of the dynamic process by which trustworthiness is built as a response
to the lack of perfect enforceability of contracts. However anecdotal evidence of
how trust can be used to compensate for the lack of formal legal agreements or
other relevant features of the institutional set up abound. Grief (1993) analyses
the formation of a coalitions by medieval merchants to compensate for limited
contract enforceability, while McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) show how rela-
tionships based on trust arise and develop in environments where where there
is virtually no contract enforcement as is the case of Vietnam. Perhaps the
most striking example comes from De Brux (2008). The author discusses the
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rst worldwide airport concession which happened in the Kingdom of Cambo-
dia, a country with a very weak judicial system, widespread corruption and no
previous history of concession contracts. The French group had a signed a con-
cession contract in 1995 to extensively modernise and run the existing airport
and also built a new one. During the summer of 1997 the Asian economic crisis
started to spread over Cambodia. At the same time, a military insurrection
took place in the capital of the country. However both parties, after months of
renegotiation, successfully amended the contract. The success of this contract
came from the willingness of both parties to allow the spirit of the contract
to prevail, rather than the letter of the contract which allowed termination of
the agreement by either side under such extreme circumstances. Cooperation
through renegotiation prevailed over opportunism in this case.6
The rm updates is beliefs about the purchasers type according to Bayes
rule:
a0(fpaidg; a0) = pr(m j fthe government pays the sellerg\a0) =
a0
a0 + (1  a0)
> a0
Hence the adjustment in a0 is upwards. This allows for the fact that the rm
may get paid even if the current government (purchaser) is not trustworthy - in
other words he would like to engage in opportunistic behaviour but is prevented
from doing so by the institutional environment which successfully enforces the
contract. Hence we have a separation of the institutional environment from a0;
the reputation (trustworthiness) of the government of the day, where the former
plays a role in the updating mechanism of the latter.
While Araujo and Ornelas discuss a series of one-period trading contracts,
the outcome of which feeds into the reputation of the buyer with whom a long
term relationship is established, we instead wish to apply this approach into a
typically long term infrastructure contract where trustworthiness tends to grow
incrementally over time. However, there is no doubt that a history of previously
successfully concession contracts in a country has a positive externality e¤ect
on future concession contracts by increasing the primal estimate by the seller
(investor) of the buyers trustworthiness. The strength of this externality will
of course depend on whether this buyer is the same or a di¤erent government.
We discuss this in the next subsection.
The probability that the rm will receive its payment increases with a0
as well as : More specically the rm has an initial prior estimate (belief)
a0 > 0 and we allow this to increase up to a maximum of 1 during the length
of the contract. In other words we dene a history according to which the
rm updates its estimate regarding the trustworthiness of the buyer during the
life of the contract as and when further information regarding the government
6Macaulay (1963), argued that a key virtue of relational contracting is that parties can
count on each other to abide buy the spirit of the contract and therefore do not waste as
much in specifying its letter. This outcome has also appeared here, despite the absence of a
previous relationship between the two contracting parties.
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becomes available. Then we label as a0k (C; a
0), the value of the estimate by
the seller of the probability that the purchaser is trustworthy given a starting
date  for the concession contract after k periods (dened in years, or months,
or even days as appropriate) during which experience is cumulated applying a
cardinality C, where C =
+k 1X
j=
hj , hj 2 f0; 1g. Hence during the length of
the contract (which, if in infrastructure, will typically tend to run in double
digit years) estimates of trustworthiness of the trading partner will be updated
through the life of the contract. Events (news) if non existent or positive are
indicated by hj = 1 (no news is good news
7) and if negative are indicated by
hj = 1   j . Under this mechanism information regarding the trustworthiness
of the government by the rm will be cumulated under time. The estimate by
the rm at time  + k of the governments trustworthiness on a contract that
started at time  is given by the following Bayesian updating process:
a0k (C; a
0
 ) =
a0
a0 + 
C(1  a0 )
(1)
Clearly if there is a bad event, C = 0, and trustworthiness will revert in the
next period back to its prior value of a0 from where it will start increasing once
more. In the absence of bad events C will increase and a0k will increase towards
its upper maximum value of 1. Hence a0k 2 [a
0
 ; 1]
The justication for this uneven treatment is that humans perceive trust
destroying events as more noticeable than trust building events; hence the former
tend to carry more weight than the latter. Once trust is lost it is costly to rebuilt
and it will take time for this to happen. The institutional environment plays a
role since payment will be enforced even if the government is untrustworthy if the
institutional factors will ensure that payment will occur in any case. However
in our model enforcement is separated from trust as the latter can compensate
for the absence of the former (Greif, 1993), although ideally the one should act
as a complement to the other as discussed in the previous section.
Hence the probability that the rm will receive payment is a = a0+(1 a0)
which is clearly increasing both in a0 and in : If the institutional setting of the
country improves, then the rm will expect to receive its payment with a higher
probability and a0 will become less important in determining the probability of
payment. If a0 is updated upwards, then the institutional parameter becomes
increasingly less important in determining the probability of payment.
Updating delays and the importance of prior beliefs
Note that a purchasers reputation at time  is not a¤ected by the increase in
 at that time (denoted by  ), as a is a function of the events that have occurred
7Tirole (2008) argues that "parties to a contract tend to specialize in identifying bad news
for themselves/good news for the other party". However in our model, the buyer faces no
participation constrains as it is the seller who pays for the investment. Hence it is in the
sellers interest to unveil both bad as well as good news that may a¤ect his expected prot.
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so far during the contract, not the current one. However it will a¤ect its future
reputation at time  + k. This means that to some extent an improvement in
 slows down the updating process regarding the trustworthiness the trading
partner because it makes it more di¢cult for the rm to determine whether the
government is complying with the terms of the contract voluntarily or because
of the institutional restrictions (including the threat of a legal or regulatory
challenge, or the commencing of external arbitration, etc.). Hence if a change
in  occurs at time  , then after k periods:
@a0k
@
=
 CC 1a0 (1  a
0
 )
a0 + 
C(1  a0 )
2 < 0 (2)
And the impact on the overall probability of payment is
dak
d
=
@(ak + (1  a
0k
 ))
@
= (1  a0k ) + (1  )
@a0k
@
(3)
dak
d
will be positive provided that:

1  

1 +
1  a0
a0
C

> C (4)
The left hand side in the above is an increasing function of : This implies
that in countries with an already strong enforcement environment (UK, France,
etc.), (4) will hold, and a further increase in  because it only has a limited
role in the trustworthiness updating mechanism will lead to increase in the
probability of payment as estimated by the seller.
However, in a country with a low initial ; its increase may reduce the prob-
ability of payment as estimated by the seller by signicantly delaying the estab-
lishment of a reputation for the buying government (i.e. delaying a0k becoming
substantially higher than the prior belief).
On the other hand experiences such as the one described by DeBrux regard-
ing Cambodia and the successful outcome in the case of the airport contract
result in a substantial increase in the prior belief a0 that will be the starting
point in a future contract. Hence there is an important externality that the his-
tory of a previously successful contract will confer on a new contract in terms
of increasing a0 , thus making further updates desirable, but less crucial than
before. If this is combined with a subsequent increase in  it will lead to a
substantial upward revision in the probability of payment ak :
The above does not negate what was discussed in section 2. It is clearly
ideal to have a combination of a high  with a high a0 complementing each
other within a contract. However it does explain why within the historical
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context of each country, the establishment of high trustworthiness by a gov-
ernment usually precedes strong enforcement institutions, rather that the other
way round. Initially it takes a genuinely honest government within a developing
country that wishes to establish trustworthiness and break with the past to do
so. Then this will be followed by the establishment of legal and regulatory insti-
tutions (typically by that same government) that will strengthen enforcement
institutions (increase ) and make the success of future contracts less govern-
ment specic, i.e. less dependent on the willingness of subsequent governments
to honor infrastructure contracts. This point is further discussed below.
The buying governments type
The governments own assessment of its trustworthiness is dened as a ran-
dom variable b representing the probability of the favourable event " = fthe
government pays the sellerg occurring, which depends on the degree of com-
mitment by the government to honour the contract and on the level of contract
enforcement in that country. Following Myerson (1979), the level of commit-
ment by the government is a variable state of nature, which is dened broadly
enough to include all subjective unknowns which might inuence it.
A country where b is markedly less than 1 is most likely to arise in cir-
cumstances where a government has entered into arrangements with private
(particularly foreign) investors but without total commitment. This introduces
major uncertainties concerning the performance of the contract in the future.
For instance, this may be so because of insu¢cient tax revenue to fund pre-
ferred public sector options, as a result of political and economic pressure from
a higher level of government, or as a condition for international lending or aid
assistance. Another case is where there is a clear possibility that a change of
regime/government would probably lead to a major renegotiation or suspension
of the contract (viz. Venezuela pre and post the Chavez presidency and the
Chad governments actions to suspend the Future Generations Fund to collect
earmarked savings from oil sales). A further possibility is where political op-
position to private investment in infrastructure increases over time so that the
political costs to the government of maintaining the private investment contracts
gradually increase, making the governments commitment to pay low. This will
lead to a decrease in the value of b.
We would normally expect that government commitment to an infrastructure
contract would be a¤ected by the level of enforcement at time  ,  , since a
government would be unlikely to enter a contract with a low probability of
paying if it knew that it is very likely that it would be forced to pay the contract
by the mechanisms in place. Hence we would expect b to be an increasing
function of :
The government has a strong incentive to inate the true actual value of b:
But even if the government truthfully reveals this value - and we shall assume
initially that this is the case - clearly a and b di¤er even when they are both
common knowledge. Disagreement on mutual beliefs can occur among rational
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agents if the agents have di¤erent priors (Aumann 1976) and they follow a
di¤erent process of updating or forming such beliefs.
Hybrid contracts
Following Athias and Saussier (2006), a hybrid contract reects the inability
of the investor in a rigid contract to reliably predict investment outcomes (both
investment costs and revenues arising). Major forecasting errors and/or major
shocks cause signicant maladaptation costs, which can be positive (e.g. where
demand is much higher than predicted for a toll road) as well as negative (e.g.
in substantive investment cost overruns or unexpectedly low demand).
Our paper considers exible contracts, rigid contracts and hybrid contracts.
We denote the exibility of the contract by . We dene fully exible contracts
(i.e. contracts where a post-signing change in contract terms, and/or a rene-
gotiation is certain) as those where  = 0. For fully rigid contracts (i.e. those
where post-investment changes in contract terms and/or renegotiations are fully
excluded),  = 1. We also consider hybrid contracts, i.e. those where there is
some positive expectation of post-investment changes in contract terms and/or
renegotiations. For such contracts, 0 <  < 1, with a greater degree of rigidity
as  ! 1.
In what follows, we rst consider three types of fully exible contracts. We
then look at rigid contracts and nally, at the hybrid contract, where there
is a positive probability of ex post renegotiation. The three types of exible
contracts that we consider are:
1. The Athias and Saussier exible contract model, but including our trust-
worthiness parameters a and b.
2. The same model with a guaranteed pre-payment mechanism.
3. A benchmark, incentive compatible "F-contract" model with prepayments.
We show that the third model sets such prepayment terms, that the total
surplus split between the infrastructure company and the government is identical
to the one found in A&S where trustworthiness terms were not included in the
model. We conclude by comparing the e¢ciency of the hybrid model to the rst
exible contract model.
We now turn to the formal analysis where, in each of the subsequent discus-
sions we analyse the bargaining model that corresponds to each of the above
models. The time line of the models is as follows:
<    + k; k > 0
T y p e o f c o n t r a c t In v e s tm e n t s a n d p ay a r e s e t U p d a t in g o f in v e s tm e n t a n d p ay
a n d p aym en t p r ov i s io n s o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e d e c i s io n s in  e x ib l e a n d  e x ib l e
a r e ch o s e n a n d s ig n e d r e a l i s e d va lu e s o f w i t h p r e p aym e n t s c o n t r a c t s
a; b, a n d  a t t im e  : R en e g o t ia t io n m ay o c c u r (1  )
P r e p aym en t s ( i f a n y ) a r e a l s o s e t in r ig id c o n t r a c t s
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3.1 Flexible contracts
Let us start with the exible contracts where we include into the expected
payo¤ functions the parameters a and b as announced respectively by the seller
(investing rm) and the buyer (government).
The rms expected prot function and the expected consumer surplus8 are
given by the following functions respectively:
f = P0   C0 + at  i
CSf = B0   P0 + fR(i)  bt
where B0 and C0 are positive constants representing, rstly, the social ben-
ets and, secondly, the costs of providing the basic service without any in-
vestment. t denotes the amount of payment going to the rm following rene-
gotiation between the company and the government on how the surplus R(i)
(R0 > 0; R00 < 0; R000 < 0) created by the investment i undertaken by the rm
will be shared between the two parties. f and  are inverse measures of the cost
of renegotiation and of the degree of asset specicity respectively. If  = 0 then
the investment is wholly sunk and hence has no opportunity cost. Therefore,
r(i) = R(i) is the proportion of the surplus R(i) which is not sunk and hence
has an opportunity cost. For infrastructure industries, r(i) is likely to have a
low value. For notational simplicity we shall henceforth refer to expected prots
and expected consumer surplus simply as prots and consumer surplus.
The Nash Bargaining solution will be used in the exible framework to de-
termine the payment going to the rm
(fR(i)  bt)(at  r(i)) (5)
The rst parenthesis shows the net gain of the investment to the buyer, while
the second parenthesis shows the yield to the seller after subtracting from the
expected payment the opportunity cost of its investment.
The participation constraint for the rm to enter in a contract with the
government in this country is
(a0 +  (1  a
0
 )) t > i  P0 + C0 (6)
The above clearly shows that the rms decision to enter a contract with the
government is dependent on the prior belief this company has regarding
the governments trustworthiness at the time  when the contract is to be signed
and the state of the institutional environment at that time. As we have already
discussed this prior may be the product of a history of previous concession
contracts in that country the success of which will lead to the upward revision
8Here we assume that the government fully represents the interests of the consumers. If
this full alignment hypothesis is dropped, then this can be easily reected by the model by
assigning appropriate weights to the consumer and producer surplus within the governments
objective function.
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of this prior, i.e. a positive externality of such contracts is internalised in the
decision of whether to participate in this new infrastructure contract. As long
as a > a; where a =
i P0+C0
t
the rm will invest.
On the other hand since it is the rm that makes the investment and pays
for it, the gain to the government is always positive. Therefore the contract
never violates the governments participation constraint.
The payment solution9 at time  + k is:
tf;k =
akfR(i) + bR(i)
2ak b
=
fR(i)
2b
+
R(i)
2ak
(7)
The equation above suggests that the lower a and b are, the higher is t, the
value of the payment to the rm. However since the contract is exible, this
payment is updated in line with the values of trustworthiness perceptions. We
have inserted the time superscript of the elapsed periods since commencement
at time  , in order to denote the stage in the update mechanism of the sellers
belief regarding the buyers trustworthiness. For brevity we have removed the
subscript of the starting time in all variables except for a, where it is retained
to distinguish ak from the prior belief of the probability of payment, a =
a0 +  (1   a
0
 ). As we have already discussed  and b may also change from
time to time.
Conclusion 1 Better trustworthiness of the government buyer as estimated by
the seller and as perceived by the government for itself will lead to a lower t
paid, and hence a better deal for the country in terms of its share of the revenue
from the project.
This result is conrmed econometrically in a recent paper by McMillan and
Waxman (2007), where their evidence indicates that higher quality of institu-
tions will lead to a larger share of the revenues from the investment accruing
to the country. In a sense an increase in a and/or b corresponds to a reduction
in the political risk premium and the cost of capital for a rm to accept a long
duration contract with the government of a particular country. It is also possi-
ble that this reduction may also increase the governments bargaining power (as
McMillan and Waxman argue), rather than just its share in the rents. (This
case is studied later, through the F-contract analysis.)
Substituting the above result back into the expected prot and consumer
surplus functions gives:
f;k = P0   C0 +
akfR(i)
2b +
R(i)
2   i
CSf;k = B0   P0 +
fR(i)
2  
b
ak
R(i)
2
Hence these expectations are continuously revised over time as the seller
updates its beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of the buyer, as well as a result
9As both expressions in the product are positive we can apply a monotonic transformation
of the expression into logarithms and easily check that both the FOC as well as the SOC are
satised.
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of any changes in b. Also note that the lower are sunk costs (i.e. the higher
is ), the higher are expected prots and the lower is the expected consumer
surplus. The prot maximising level of investment for the rm is:
if;k j R0(if;k) =
2b
akf + b
(8)
Hence investment decisions taken by the rm are updated in accordance to
his beliefs regarding the probability of payment by the buying government. It
follows that as R00 < 0, @i
f;k
@b
< 0 while @i
f;k
@
; @i
f ;k
@ak
; @i
f;k
@f
> 0: Total expected
welfare at time  + k is:
W f;k = +CS = B0 C0+

ak + b
2b

fR(if )+

ak   b
2ak

R(if;k)  if;k (9)
From (8) if b > ak , then:
if;k j R0(if;k)b>ak =
2b
akf + b
>
2b
bf + b
=
2
f + 
= if j R0(if )b=ak<1 = i
f j R0(if )b=ak=1
(10)
Since R0 = 2b
akf+b
; it is easy to conclude that R0 is an increasing function
of b and a decreasing function of ak : As R
0 is an inverse function of investment
(since R00 < 0), this means that investment and surplus are decreasing functions
of b and increasing functions of ak . The above results indicate that
i
f;k
b=ak<1
= if;k
b=ak=1
and R(if;k
b=ak<1
) = R(if;k
b=ak=1
)
For high levels of investment and corresponding surplus what matters is that
b = ak irrespective of whether absolute trustworthiness levels are high or low.
Hence high levels of trustworthiness (b = ak = 1) are not required, rather just
matching values of b and ak .
Conclusion 2 Untrustworthy agents can transact as e¢ciently as trustworthy
agents provided that they hold similar estimates of the buyers commitment to the
payment agreement in the contract, provided that these are above a minimum
level a. Investment levels will be as high as when the probability of payment
perceived by each side is one, if the update mechanism of trustworthiness of
the beliefs of the seller results into the buyer being trusted (by the seller) to
carry o¤ the payment to the degree that it deserves to be trusted (in terms of
its commitment). Hence alignment of beliefs, rather than whether the buyer
government is per se a trustworthy contracting party, is important.
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Conclusion 2 explains why some countries which are ruled by a tight and
corrupt elite where ak and b are both low but matching, can still sustain private
investment in sunk assets through renegotiation with a monopoly supplier (as
in the case of some sub-Saharan African countries). Note that this model of
matching expectations only works in exible contracts as it depends on contin-
uous updating and renegotiation, or within a relational contract arrangement.
Undertrusting adds a deadweight loss by making the expected welfare func-
tion directly dependent on  as indicated in (9). The higher  is (the lower
sunk costs are) then the higher this loss is. Moreover the surplus following rene-
gotiation is now multiplied by a factor
ak+b
2b less than one, that measures the
degree of undertrusting.
Conclusion 3 Undertrusting is damaging not only because it reduces the in-
vestment and corresponding surplus accruing to the society, but also because it
reduces the welfare expectations by which a decision authority would rank this
contractual choice.
Note that the opposite conclusion holds for overtrusting. Overtrusting di-
rectly increases expected welfare in the two ways mentioned above. This means
that exible contracts where overtrusting is present will lead to big expected
welfare gains in the short run. However they are likely to end in rapid contract
collapse as soon as there is a realignment of expectations held by the investing
companies to more realistic values (viz. Argentina in the late 1990s).
Theorem 1 When renegotiation costs are su¢ciently low and asset specicity
su¢ciently high, expected welfare is a decreasing function of the governments
(buyers) perception of its trustworthiness and an increasing function of the
selling rms perception of the governments trustworthiness.
This holds when f

> b
ak
> 1: In other words for akf > b (b > a
k
 ), b
(ak ) has a negative (positive) indirect impact on expected welfare, reinforcing
the negative (positive) direct impact of the same parameter on the function.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
As was shown earlier, if b > ak ; expected welfare W
f is smaller than it
would be if b was reduced to equal ak (and vice versa). Hence undertrusting
reduces expected welfare, just as overtrusting increases it (albeit temporarily as
mentioned earlier). Such a result does not require complete trustworthiness,
but rather only that b = ak . We now turn out attention to an attempt to tackle
the problem of trust misalignment with the use of prepayment contracts.
3.2 Prepayment contracts
As mentioned in page 5, prepayment contracts can be viewed broadly so as to in-
clude arrangements with partial risk guarantees, where the guarantee is against
the opportunism that may arise from the side of the government/regulator.
For exible contracts with prepayments, the Nash bargaining problem is:
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(fR(i)  P0   bt)(P0 + a
k
 t  r(i))
which gives a payment solution:
tP0;k =
akfR(i) + bR(i)  (a
k
 + b)P0
2ak b
(11)
Substituting this back into the expected prot function and consumer surplus
functions gives:
P0 = P0   C0 +
akfR(i)+bR(i) (a+b)P0
2b   i =
(b a )P0
2b +
akf
2b R(i) +
b
2bR(i)  C0   i
CSP0 = B0   P0  
akfR(i)+bR(i) (a+b)P0
2ak
+ fR(i) =
= B0 +
(b ak )P0
2ak
+
akf
2ak
R(i)  b
2ak
R(i)
A prepayment will be set on the basis of the values at time  : The existence
of a prepayment will clearly a¤ect the participation constraint of the rm as a
will now become a =
C0+i 
(b a )P0
2b
tP0
: As both expected prot as well as expected
consumer surplus are increasing functions of the prepayment, this can be set at
a maximum when there is an issue of undertrusting (b > a) :
P0 =
afR(i)+bR(i)
a+b
which if replaced into the above functions they become
P0;k =
(a+a
k
 )fR(i)+[2b+(a a
k
 )]R(i)
2(a+b)
  C0   i
CSP0;k = B0 +
(a+a
k
 )[bfR(i) bR(i)]
2ak (a+b)
The prot maximising level of investment at time  + k is:
iP0;k j R0(iP0;k) =
2(a + b)
(a + ak )f + [2b+ (a   a
k
 )]
(12)
It is easy to check that R0(iP0;k) is decreasing in ak (for f > ), which
combined with ak = a means that it takes its maximum value for R
0(iP0;k=0) =
a+b
af+b
: Clearly as R0 > 0; R00 < 0 and R00 < 0, then since b > ak = a :
R0(iP0;k>0) 6 R0(iP0;k=0) =
a + b
af + b
< R0(if;k=0) =
2b
af + b
: (13)
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It follows that time at time +k both the investment and the corresponding
surplus in a prepayment contract are higher than at time  ; which in turn are
higher than the investment and surplus in a exible contract at time  . The
inequality reads as:
iP0;k>0 > iP0;k=0 > if;k=0 and R(iP0;k>0) > R(iP0;k=0) > R(if;k=0): (14)
It is worth noting, that some of the appeal of a exible contract may be
restored over time if the trustworthiness of the government, as updated by the
seller during the life of the contract, increases upwards over time (albeit in a
snakes and ladders form). At su¢ciently high levels of ak ; the level of investment
if;k>0 (which > if;k=0) may come to exceed rst iP0;k=0, and then eventually
even iP0;k>0 at the same time period. Therefore, at its later stages and if
upwards trustworthiness updating has not been interrupted, a exible contract
with no prepayments may look preferable to the one with prepayments in terms
of the investment incentives the former provides.
The expected welfare function at time  (k = 0) is:
WP0;k=0 = B0   C0 + fR(i
P0;k=0)  iP0;k=0 (15)
We next calculate the impact of b on WP0;k=0, again through the split of
the total derivative into a direct and an indirect e¤ect. As the direct e¤ect on
expected welfare is clearly equal to zero at time  , we get:
dWP0
db
= @W
P0
@iP0
@iP0
@b
= b(f )
(af+b)
a (f )
(af+b)2R00(iP0;k=0)
= ba (f )
2
(af+b)3R00(iP0;k=0)
which clearly is negative as R00(iP0) < 0: Hence again b has a negative impact
on welfare in the case of a prepayment contract.
Similarly,
@WP0;k=0
@a
= @W
P0;k=0
@iP0;k=0
@iP0;k=0
@a
= b(f )
(af+b)
b(a f)
(af+b)2R00(iP0;k=0)
=
 b2(f )2
(af+b)3R00(iP0;k=0)
> 0
Conclusion 4 Under prepayment contracts, expected welfare is a decreasing
function of the buying states probability of payment, and an increasing function
of the sellers estimate of receiving payment. The impact of both at time 
is only limited to their impact on the level of investment and neither a¤ects
the expected welfare function directly. As already noted the preference for a
prepayment contract relative to a exible one is decreasing in ak=0 :
Theorem 2 The higher the degree of undertrusting, the more e¢cient are pre-
payment contracts compared to exible contracts.
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Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
This gives us a preference relation for the decision maker between the two
types of contracts, dened in a similar way to that of Myerson relating prizes
(here welfare) to variable states of nature (here pay occurring), where the latter
encompasses all subjective unknowns which might inuence the prize to be
received.
Issues of incentive compatibility may exist in exible contracts. In particular,
it may be benecial for the buyer to declare an overestimate of his commitment
to pay given that this will reduce the share of the payment that goes to the
rm. Even with the context of a prepayment contract the buyer may still have
an incentive to overstate b:
Theorem 3 Both the exible payment contracts and the exible prepayment
contracts are not always incentive compatible as buyer governments have an
incentive to exaggerate their stated trustworthiness to a considerable extent.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
Therefore in both types of contracts the buyer has an incentive to overstate
his trustworthiness as long as the adverse impact that an inated b has on
investment is not so detrimental for it to more than o¤set any direct gains
accruing to the buyer by overstating his trustworthiness.
3.3 F-contracts
If we drop the assumption that the buyer will always honestly declare its esti-
mate of its own trustworthiness, then in this case it will be more appropriate to
use an F-prepayment contract of the form:
F = (fR(i)  P0   bt)
ak (P0 + a
k
 t  r(i))
b
Such a contract allows the trustworthiness declared by each party to a¤ect
the payo¤ of the other party. This approach coupled up with prepayments makes
the payo¤s going to both parties independent of the trustworthiness parameters.
As we will show below, the impact of undertrusting on investment and welfare
can be eliminated by establishing an F-contract.
The relevance of this model is not as a real world possible contract but in its
role as a hypothetical benchmark. As we have seen exible contracts become
more di¢cult to agree and sustain as b
ak
increases, because such contracts are
no longer incentive compatible. The level of e¢ciency as measured by welfare,
achieved by the benchmark F-contract model is only possible in the pure exible
and exible prepayment contracts when ak = b.
For F-contracts, the payment solution is determined by maximising F with
respect to t:
t =
fR(i) + R(i)  2P0
ak + b
(16)
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PF = P0   C0 + a
k

fR(i)+R(i) 2P0
ak+b
  i =
(b a)P0+a
k
fR(i)+a
k
R(i)
a+b   C0   i
CSPF = B0 P0  b
fR(i)+R(i) 2P0
ak+b
+fR(i) = B0+
(b ak )P0+a
k
fR(i) bR(i)
ak+b
As both of the above functions are increasing functions of the prepayment
amount, the latter needs to be increased as the level of undertrusting (b > ak )
increases. This eliminates the incentive for the state to announce a trustworthi-
ness higher than its true one in order to improve its share of consumer surplus
as the prepayment is:
P0 =
fR(i)+R(i)
2
which is independent of both a and b. This means that the prepayment is
time independent. If replaced into the expected prot and consumer surplus
functions these also become time independent and respectively equal to:
PF =
(ak+b)(fR(i)+R(i))
2(ak+b)
  C0   i =
fR(i)
2 +
R(i)
2   C0   i
CSPF = B0 +
(ak+b)fR(i) (a
k
+b)R(i)
2(ak+b)
= B0 +
fR(i)
2  
R(i)
2
The prepayment prot maximising level of investment is:
iPF j R0(iPF ) =
2
f + 
(17)
WPF = B0   C0 + fR(i
PF )  iPF (18)
We see that the investment decision within an F-contract is identical to
the one in the A&S model, and similarly the payments to the seller and the
buyer are independent of the trustworthiness parameters. The F-contracts fully
avoid the implications of trustworthiness by introducing a system of prepayments
such that both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ects of such parameters are
eliminated. This also means that the investment decisions taken by the rm are
not dependent on the updating mechanism of the sellers beliefs regarding the
trustworthiness of the buyer. The key point is that the payments in the A&S
model have now become prepayments in the F-contracts.
Theorem 4 The higher the degree of undertrusting, the more e¢cient an F-
contract compared to a exible one and to a exible prepayment one.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
Using expected welfare as a criterion, within undertrusting an F-contract
will rank as superior to the other two types of exible contracts.
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3.4 Rigid contracts
We dene as rigid a contract that species the main contract terms (e.g. prices,
payments, etc.) in advance of the investment  and for the duration of the
contract. In addition, the contract permanently species the level of the invest-
ments to be made.
Renegotiation is excluded from the theoretical model. However, in practice,
renegotiation cannot be excluded and is common  not least to rescue projects
where one or both parties nds emerging outcomes becoming unacceptable.
Hence, the pure model is, to some extent, a hypothetical reference model.
The model incorporates some of this via the introduction of maladaptation
costs, which are dened as the di¤erence between expected surplus levels and
actual (outcome) surplus levels. The impact of maladaptation costs, f , falls
on investment levels; the way in which this happens is explained directly below.
However, higher than expected maladaptation costs will inevitability increase
the probability to renegotiate a rigid contract. This latter issue is discussed in
the 3.5, while in this section we temporarily assume that such a probability is
equal to zero.
In this model, the expected payo¤s are:
r = P0   C0 + afR(i)  i
CSr = B0   P0 + (1  fb)R(i)
The value of the maladaptation parameter, f < 1, is an inverse measure of
the potential size of the investors loss over the distribution of outcomes; e.g.
actual versus expected tra¢c ows for toll roads. This parameter in our model
is multiplied by the investors expectation a that the buyer will pay him the
surplus agreed in the contract. Correspondingly, the surplus received by the
purchasing government is increased by this investors loss.
The rm will choose an investment level ir such that:
ir j R0(ir) =
1
af
(19)
So in this case the level of investment only depends on the prior belief held
by the seller regarding the trustworthiness of the buyer,a .
In this model, expected welfare is:
W r = r + CSr = B0   C0 +

1 + (a   b)f

R(ir)  ir (20)
As in the case of exible uncertain contracts, W r is a decreasing function
of b, and an increasing function of a: For the case of a = b; the maladaptation
costs only inuence welfare indirectly (through their impact on investment). If
b > a (undertrusting) then the direct impact of f is negative and constitutes a
deadweight loss, while in the reverse case of overtrusting its direct impact on
welfare is positive.
The governments own perception of its trustworthiness only has a direct
e¤ect on welfare, as investment is not a¤ected by b. Hence:
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dW r
db
=  fR(ir) < 0
The impact of a on welfare still retains both a direct and an indirect e¤ect:
dW r
da
= @W
f
@a
+ @W
r
@ir
@ir
@a
= fR(if ) +
h
1+(a b)f
af
  1
i
@ir
@a
,
dW r
da
= fR(if ) +
1 bf
af
@ir
@a
> 0
In other words, with undertrusting W r is an increasing function of a , i.e.
an increasing function of the sellers prior belief regarding the trustworthiness
of the buying state. Unlike the exible uncertain payment contracts, here the
actual size of the parameter a does matter on investment since if a = b < 1:
ir j R0(ir)b=a<1 =
1
af
> ir j R0(ir)b=a=1 =
1
f
, ira=b<1 < i
r
a=b=1 (21)
This implies that R(ir)b=a<1 < R(i
r)b=a=1.
In summary, for rigid contracts matching estimates of trustworthiness are
still important, but in this case, unlike the exible contract case, the absolute
level of the prior belief a is important and needs to be high. Good outcomes on
e¢ciency and investment require both a to be close to one, as well as aligned
values between b and this prior belief.
3.5 Hybrid contracts
We nally analyse the hybrid model, where there is always the probability
that subsequent to investment taking place, rigid contracts will be renegoti-
ated, and/or key terms reset. Following this, the key issues we explore in this
section is the relative e¢ciency (in terms of welfare) between exible to hybrid
models in terms of the values key parameters: a) maladaptation costs, b) the
probability of renegotiation of an ex ante rigid contract, c) sunk costs and d)
renegotiation costs.
We follow the terminology of A&S and denote by (1  ) the probability to
see an ex ante rigid contract renegotiated. We calculate the prot function of
the rm:
H = r + (1  )f =
= 
 
P0   C0 + afR(i)  i

+ (1  )

P0   C0 +
akfR(i)
2b +
R(i)
2   i

,
H = P0   C0 + aR(i)

f +
(1  )akf
2ba
+
(1  )
2a

  i (22)
The prot maximising level of investment at time  + k will be:
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iH;k j R0(iH;k) =
2
(2af  
ak
b
f   ) +
ak
b
f + 
=
2b
2a bf + (1  )(akf + b)
(23)
So when  = 1; the results are identical to those of a rigid contract as the
government can credibly commit not to renegotiate the contract, while for  = 0
they coincide with those in the exible model discussed in the beginning of this
paper. We focus on the hybrid case where 0 <  < 1:
Calculating the di¤erence between the hybrid and the exible contracts,
CSH;k = CSr + (1  )CSf = 
 
B0   P0 + (1  fb)R(i)

+
+(1  )

B0   P0 +
fR(i)
2  
b
ak
R(i)
2

=
B0   P0 +

(1  fb) + (1  ) f2   (1  )
b
ak

2

R(i)
Hence the expected welfare outcome in the hybrid contract at time  + k,
WH;k; is:
WH;k = B0   C0 +

 + f(a   b)

R(iH;k) + (1  )
ak b
2ak
R(iH;k)+
+(1  )f
ak+b
2b R(i
H:k)  iH;k
If we calculate the di¤erence between the expected welfare in a hybrid con-
tract and the expected welfare in a exible contract we get:
WH;k W f;k = +f(a b)R(i
H;k)+

f
ak + b
2b
+ 
ak   b
2ak
 
(1  )R(iH;k) R(if:k)

+
+iH;k   if;k (24)
We next calculate the impact on this di¤erence of all the parameters, namely
f; f;  and : We present the direct and indirect e¤ects (through investment)
of all these parameters in the appendix. The results lead us to the following
conclusions:
Proposition 1 For akf > b and  > 0; the lower are maladaptation costs
(the higher is f), the more e¢cient is the hybrid model relative to the exible
one. But if the negative direct (welfare) e¤ect comes to dominate the positive
indirect one (on investment), then the exible model is more e¢cient relative to
the hybrid one.
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Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
Notice how the existence of undertrusting gives rise to the requirement that
sunk costs are su¢ciently high and renegotiation costs su¢ciently low for akf >
b to hold; a condition more demanding than in corresponding proposition in
the A&S paper, where the necessary condition was that f > . Our analysis in
the appendix shows that the assumption akf > b implies that the impact of
investment on welfare is positive for both types of contracts

@WH
@iH
; @W
f
@if
> 0

:
Specically, the gap between f and  needs to be su¢ciently high so that
when the former is multiplied by the updated belief of the rm regarding the
probability of pay by the government, ak < 1 and the latter by b (> a
k
 ), the
inequality does not change its direction. The more pronounced undertrusting
becomes (the higher the gap between b and ak is), the higher the di¤erence
between f and  needs to be for the proposition to hold.
In other words, the higher the level of undertrusting, the less likely is the
hybrid contract to be more e¢cient. This is because an increase in the gap
between b and a will make the inequality akf > b increasingly more di¢cult
to sustain. If it becomes unsustainable and akf < b; then the positive impact
of f on welfare will be far smaller and, possibly, even negative. Hence substantial
undertrusting may turn the tables in favour of the exible contract!
The next three propositions, which are all formally set out, proved and
analysed in the appendix, set the preference relations for a decision maker be-
tween the hybrid and the exible contract based on expected welfare.
Proposition 2 argues that the lower the probability to renegotiate is, the more
e¢cient a hybrid contract compared to a exible one. Undertrusting lessens the
positive impact of  on the expected welfare superiority of the hybrid contract.
The direct e¤ect of  may be negative; if this is the case it will reduce or even
dominate the positive indirect e¤ect of  on welfare. So extensive undertrusting
reduces the strength of this proposition and may even come to reverse it.
Proposition 3 argues that the lower the asset specicity the more e¢cient
a exible contract compared to a hybrid one. As long as we restrict the direct
negative impact of a higher  on the superiority of the exible contract to be
larger (in absolute terms) that the same impact on exible contract (this can
be done by assuming a su¢ciently low );the direct e¤ect further reinforces the
welfare superiority of the exible contract as established in terms of the indirect
e¤ect.
Finally, according to proposition (4), provided that  is su¢ciently high for
the positive direct e¤ect of f on expected welfare to be larger under a exible
rather than hybrid contract, this direct e¤ect will reinforce the indirect e¤ect
in supporting the argument that the expected welfare superiority of the exible
model will increase as f increases.
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4 DISCUSSIONAND IMPLICATIONSOFTHE
MODEL
In the literature to date, there is no distinction between trust levels between
investors and (buyer) governments. Indeed, the implicit assumption is that there
is no misalignment between these two. However, this may be an unfortunate
simplication.
The reality is not only that contracts are most likely to break down when
there is such misalignment, but also that as we have shown it is unlikely to
achieve incentive compatible contracts unless perceptions can be aligned. That,
in turn, may help explain whether infrastructure contracts that run into di¢cul-
ties can be renegotiated between the parties. Our conjecture is that in circum-
stances where the sellers perception of the reliability of the buyer is much lower
than the buyers, the contract is most likely to break down irrevocably. For con-
tracts where the sellers updated perception of the buyers reliability overshoots
(is higher than justied given the buyers type, e.g. there is overtrusting), con-
tracts may continue satisfactorily until the misalignment is revealed at which
point they are likely to fall apart rapidly. Conversely, contracts can survive
where the levels of trust are low but perceptions are correctly aligned.
Most of the discussion on trust and most of the theoretical models in this
eld accept that a and b can be high or low depending on the country or project
but, implicitly or explicitly assume that a = b. However, there are circumstances
where a and b are both low (e.g. under 0.5) but both parties have the same
perspective and hence private investment in infrastructure may be sustainable.
Conversely, there may be circumstances where a and b are both relatively high
(e.g. above 0.5) but a is su¢ciently less than b so as to create a signicant
degree of mistrust.
Table 1
Perceptions of Trustworthiness
Case (A) Case (C)
Repeat project and/or contract New type of project or contract
Country with strong institutions Country with strong institutions
and high trustworthiness reputation and high trustworthiness reputation
a = b; a; b  ! 1 (large) a < b; a; b & 0:5 (moderate)
Case (B) Case (D)
Repeat project and/or contract New type of project or contract
Country with weak and/or Country with past history of weak
corrupt institutions and/or corrupt institutions but trying to
establish reputation for trustworthiness
a = b; a; b  ! 0 a < b; a; b < 0:5 (small)
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These issues were fully explored in the theoretical model set out in the
previous sections. We can summarise these by setting out a simple typology,
based on a 4 quadrant table as in Table 1 above we then set out and discuss
some illustrative examples on each case as set in this table. The table and the
discussion focuses primarily on undertrusting, but we will say something further
on overtrusting afterwards. Let us briey consider each quadrant in turn.
Case (A) represents well-established types of project in high reputation coun-
tries. For many types of infrastructure concession contracts, trust is likely to
be high and the contracting parties may well be able to monitor, enforce and
revise their contracts straightforwardly, without a need for external assistance
(other than occasionally for arbitration/dispute resolution or similar) or for
pre-payment arrangements. Hence, private investment is readily forthcoming
and at a reasonable cost of capital as perceived risk is low.Examples include
repeat water supply management contracts in easy to access and process water
(as in Menard and Saussier), repeat UK PPP contracts in politically uncon-
tentious sectors, electricity distribution in Chile. This is a sustainable and
e¢cient process that is potentially welfare maximising.
Case (B) represents infrastructure contracts in countries with low quality in-
stitutions. Supplying companies can and do have supply contracts with govern-
ments in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere where government
is arbitrary and/or corrupt  and liable to change on the replacement of the
current autocrat. These contracts can support investment.
The key point is that they are relational contracts where the monitoring,
enforcement and revision is done between the two parties who know one another
well. The contracts will only be sustainable if the supplier can expect to receive
a return adjusted for higher risks and for any (potentially large) corruption
payments  both buyer and seller may receive returns from corrupt practices.
Clearly, these contracts are far from optimal for the consumers or taxpayers
in the countries concerned and are likely to be monopoly contracts that do not
allow any competitive entry (e.g. no independent power producers or competing
telecom operators). But, given aligned beliefs on each partys trustworthiness
of the regime over the life of the contract, they do allow a low-level, incentive
compatible equilibrium with positive private investment and without the need
for a pre-payment arrangement. This process is sustainable (at least while
the current parties continue) but it is highly ine¢cient and far from welfare
maximizing.
Case (C) represents early and potentially di¢cult contracts in high reputa-
tion countries. In the UK, the London Underground PPPs were in this cate-
gory (and one  the Tube Line PPP - appears to be progressing well, even if the
Metronet PPP has failed) as were the NATS air tra¢c control contract and early
PPPs in hospitals and prisons. In these cases, to sustain the contract, it helps
to have an external regulator  the PPP Arbiter for the London Underground,
the Civil Aviation Authority for NATS.
Note that in most of these cases, there has been an explicit or implicit govern-
ment guarantee providing a pre-payment facility. There clearly are potential
incentive compatibility problems so that breakdown is likely in the case of major
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disputes. But, provided the rst contract (or rst few years of the contract) go
well and any major problems are addressed by successful renegotiation (as with
NATS), subsequent contracts or periods should go well as updating may mean
that ak becomes equal to or close to b.
Most of these contracts faced not only signicant political risk, but most
also had serious construction, technology, demand and/or demand risks. The
London Underground contracts also had major issues of ongoing rather than
front-loaded investment. Interestingly, an early major success for UK PPPs was
the Dartford bridge crossing of the River Thames. For that project, an e¤ective
and robust pre-payment mechanism was put in place through allowing the
duration of the concession to correspond to that necessary for the contractor to
recover his principal and earn an agreed rate of return (i.e. an NPV contract).
Finally, Case (D) represents countries that start with poor reputations but
are trying hard to obtain private investment into infrastructure e.g. into roads,
power generation, sometimes water. To attract that investment, governments
may pass concession laws, introduce independent regulators or allow external
arbitration or similar. Examples of such countries include Uganda, Nigeria,
Mozambique and Romania.
However, supplying companies are likely to want a demonstrable record of
achievement for those institutions before reducing their cost of capital risk pre-
mia. Hence, the private investment may not be possible  at least not at a cost
that would be acceptable in terms of the nal tari¤. In these circumstances,
private investment will only be forthcoming and sustainable if there is external
support in place e.g. from an e¤ective pre-payment agreement. That is where
transitional regulatory risk guarantees and other forms of external underpinning
(e.g. on-demand guarantees, bilateral investment treaties, comprehensive credit
insurance, etc.) can help align perceptions or relative trustworthiness.
If this process is successful and the country oats away from the (hope-
fully unused) pre-payment support, the result is an e¢cient equilibrium with
realigned trust perceptions.
The table omits overtrusting. The latter raises more di¢cult issues and
seems to be much more di¢cult to anticipate. The non-alignment of trust
perceptions is only revealed after some time. Typically it is not only some period
after pre-agreed investments have been made, but later when unanticipated
problems have arisen which require an increase in the revenue requirement if
the supplying entity under the contract is not to be forced into bankruptcy.
Sometimes, as in the Argentinian case, the misperception is on the powers of
any regulatory agency, particularly at times of crisis.
Note that sometimes trust perception problems clearly exist, but it is un-
clear whether we are observing undertrusting or overtrusting. The collapse
of the London Underground Metronet PPPs initially looks like an example of
undertrusting  and certainly some of the features of the contract reect un-
dertrusting via the political risks from the hostility of the London authorities
to a PPP model. However, it is also possible to argue that the failure is a case
of overtrusting where the investor believed that the contract was closer to a
cost-plus contract than was actually the case. This example points to the need,
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in future work, to extend the model to encompass perceptions of sellers as well
as of buyers.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The key conclusions of this paper are:
(i) How far governments and investors share close perceptions of government
trustworthiness in contract enforcement is at least as important for the sustain-
ability of infrastructure contracts and investment as whether absolute levels of
trust are high or low.
(ii) Undertrusting (i.e. where the company has a lower perception of govern-
ment trustworthiness than the government has) is the more frequently observed
case. This occurs when investing infrastructure rms have a lower expectation
of full payment under the contract than the government has. Updating of the
former with no interuptions may allow undertrusting to be eventually resolved
at some point during the duration of the contract.
(iii) The negative e¤ects of undertrusting increase the higher the degree of
trust misalignment.
(iv) Undertrusting is a transitional state of imbalance, primarily associated
with innovative contracts or rst-time contracting parties. To rectify it, requires
the use of external measures such as pre-payment arrangements, regulatory
and/or other guarantees, or other specic actions to realign initially di¤erent
perceptions.
(v) Overtrusting is theoretically less likely and is also less frequently observed
in practice. It is not easy to rectify, and when revealed is likely to lead to rapid
contract breakdown. The revelation is likely to arise when the buyer approaches
the seller for a post-investment revenue increase relative to what was expected
and/or specied in the original contract .
(vi) Rigid contracts appear particularly unattractive in our model as they are
dependent for sustainability not only on closely aligned trust perceptions, but
also on high absolute levels of trust, whereas exible relational infrastructure
concession contracts are potentially sustainable with low but aligned levels of
trust, typically on a relational basis.
(vii) Under conditions of undertrusting, exible contracts are not incentive
compatible so that successful renegotiation in situations of serious problems is
likely to be very di¢cult.
(viii) Hybrid contracts tend to be more e¢cient than either pure rigid or
exible contracts except at higher levels of undertrusting when exible contracts
dominate  assuming they are sustainable.
(ix) The potential for trust misalignments e.g. over future investment re-
quirements and costs, technology uncertainties, political sensitivities, etc. pro-
vides additional support for the role of external regulatory or similar agencies,
guarantees and similar mechanisms. These also support the use of hybrid con-
tracts (rigid contracts but with a strictly positive probability of renegotiation.)
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The work reported here is, as far as we are aware, a rst attempt to seriously
model the role of potential trust estimates and trust misalignments on invest-
ment and expected welfare estimates used to evaluate infrastructure contracts.
Such an analysis helps bring out the potential role of regulatory agencies, of ex-
ternal guarantee mechanisms and of contract features that reduce uncertainty
(e.g. NPV contracts).
We look forward to seeing whether our proposed framework and approach
can be usefully extended. More importantly, we would like to be able to test
its predictions using real world data on infrastructure contracts in developing
as well as in OECD countries.
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7 APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
We rst show that W f;k is a decreasing function of b. To calculate the
impact of b on W f;k we split this into a direct and an indirect e¤ect; the latter
evaluates the impact of b onW f;k via the impact of b on the level of investment.
Hence:
dW f;k
db
= @W
f;k
@b
+ @W
f;k
@if
@if;k
@b
=  
2ak
(2b)2 fR(i
f;k)  1
2ak
R(if;k)+h
ak+b
2b f
2b
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f+b
+
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 b
2ak
 2b
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f+b
  1
i
@if;k
@b
=
 
2ak
(2b)2
fR(if;k)  1
2ak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b(akf b)
ak (a
k
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)
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=
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b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b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2ak f
(ak f+b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2
R00(if;k)
,
dW f;k
db
=  
2ak
(2b)
2 fR(i
f;k) 
1
2ak
R(if;k) +
2fb(akf   b)
(akf + b)
3R00(if;k)
(25)
If b > ak (undertrusting) and
f

> b
ak
> 1; @W
f;k
@if;k
=
b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b)
> 0; and
@R0(if;k)
@b
=
2akf
(akf+b)
2 > 0. The latter implies a negative impact of b on the level
of investment if;k since @i
f;k
@b
= @i
f;k
@R0(if;k)
@R0(if;k)
@b
=
@R0(if;k)
@b
R00(if;k)
< 0. Therefore,
b has a negative indirect impact on expected welfare, reinforcing the negative
direct impact.
Similarly, we calculate the impact of ak on W
f :
dW f;k
dak
= @W
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@ak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f;k
@if;k
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@ak
= 12bfR(i
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)
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k
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As @R
0(if;k)
@ak
=  2bf
(akf+b)
2 < 0; this implies a positive impact of ak on the
level of investment if;k since @i
f;k
@ak
= @i
f;k
@R0(if;k)
@R0(if;k)
@ak
=
@R0(if;k)
@ak
R00(if;k)
> 0.
Proof of Theorem 2
Taking the di¤erence betweenWP0 W f at time  (k = 0) and di¤erentiating
with respect to b gives:
@(WP0 W f )
@b
= 2a
(2b)2
fR(if ) + 12a R(i
f )  b(af b)
a (af+b)
@if
@b
+ b(f )
(af+b)
@iP0
@b
=
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(2b)2
fR(if ) + 12a R(i
f )  2fb(af b)
(af+b)3R00(if )
+ ba (f )
2
(af+b)3R00(iP0 )
=
= 2a
(2b)2
fR(if ) + 12a R(i
f ) + b
(af+b)3
a (f )
2R00(if ) 2f(af b)R
00(iP0 )
R00(if )R00(iP0 )
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where since R00; R000 < 0 and iP0 > if we have that R00(iP0) < R00(if ) < 0:
Analogously,
@(WP0 W f )
@a
=  b
2(f )2
(af+b)3R00(iP0 )
  12bfR(i
f )  2b(2a )2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)
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 (a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)3R00(if )
=
=   12bfR(i
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2
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2
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f+b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2bfR(i
f )+ 2b(2a )2R(i
f ); we will have that @(W
P0 W f )
@b
is positive and @(W
P0 W f )
@a
negative. Hence as undertrusting increases because a decreases and/or b de-
creases, a prepayment contract becomes more e¢cient in relation to a exible
contract.
Proof of Theorem 3
Let us assume a falsely declared beta (say bdl) higher that the true beta (say
btr). By totally di¤erentiating the payment solution in (8) we get that:
dtf;k
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As f >  and 1 > bdl > btr, the term in the brackets is positive and hence the
overall indirect e¤ect is negative. Hence the buyer has an incentive to overstate
his trustworthiness as long as the impact of an inated b on investment is not so
detrimental as to substantially reduce both i and hence R (which are determined
by the rm given its prot maximising investment decision) to such an extent
that more than o¤sets any direct gains for the buyer.
Similarly, for the case of prepayments, by totally di¤erentiating P0 =
afR(i)+b
dlR(i)
a+bdl
,
we get that:
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10This is rather unlikely: clearly f
2
 2
2f
is an increasing function of f and a decreasing
function of ; hence unless the former is small and the latter large this inequality is unlikely
to hold. If f

> b
a
> 1; it is more likely than not that f
2
 2
2f
> b a
a
rather than the other
way round.
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Hence as
CSP0 = B0   P0 + fR(i)  0b
tr ,
dCSP0
dbdl
= f a+b
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f+bdl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dbdl
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dCSP0
dbdl
=
a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(27)
Hence again the buyer has an incentive to overstate his trustworthiness pro-
vided that the impact of an inated b on investment is not so detrimental that
the reduction in investment as denoted by the second term in the relation above
more than o¤sets any direct gains to the buyer (as denoted by the rst term).
However, unlike dCS
f
dbdl
; dCS
P0
dbdl
does not depend on the magnitude of the true
value of b; btr:
Proof of Theorem 4
Comparing the PF solution (prepayment F-contracts) to those of pure ex-
ibility contracts f or prepayment ones, it is easy to show that for b > a > a
k
 :
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it follows that iPF > iP0;k; iPF > if;k and R(iPF ) > R(iP0;k), R(iPF ) >
R(if;k):
As @W
PF
@iPF
= fR0(iPF )   1 = 2f f 
f+
= f 
f+
, @i
PF
@b
= @i
PF
@R0(iPF )
@R0(iPF )
@b
=
@R0(iPF )
@b
R00(iPF )
= 0 and @R
0(iPF )
@b
= 0, both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ects
of b on welfare are zero. Hence taking the di¤erence between WPF  W f and
di¤erentiating with respect to b gives:
@(WPF W f;k)
@b
=
2ak
(2b)2
fR(if;k) + 1
2ak
R(if;k) 
b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b)
@if;k
@b
> 0
Hence the higher b is, the more e¢cient is the F- prepayment contract as
compared to the pure exible contract of A&S.
Similarly both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ect of a on WPF is zero,
and hence the lower ak is, the more e¢cient an F- prepayment contract as
compared to a exible contract.
In an analogous manner, we compare the expected welfare implications of
an F-contract to that of a prepayment contract. Calculating:
WPF  WP0;k = fR(iPF )  iPF   fR(iP0;k) + iP0;k
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and di¤erentiating WP0;k with respect to b gives:
dWP0;k
db
= @W
P0;k
@b
+ @W
P0
@iP0;k
@iP0;k
@b
= @W
P0;k
@b
+ @W
P0
@iP0;k
@R0(iP0;k)
@b
@iP0;k
@R0(iP0;k)
The direct e¤ect of b on the expected welfare in a prepayment contract is:
@WP0;k
@b
=
(a+a
k
 )(f )R(i
P0;k)
2(a+b)2
+
2(ak)(a+a
k
 )(f )R(i
P0;k)(a+b) 2(ak)(a+a
k
 )(f )R(i
P0;k)b
4(ak )
2(a+b)2
=
=
(ak)(a+a
k
 )(f )R(i
P0;k)
2(ak )(a+b)
2 +
(a+a
k
 )(f )R(i
P0;k)(a+b) (a+a
k
 )(f )R(i
P0;k)b
2(ak )(a+b)
2 ,
@WP0;k
@b
=
(a+a
k
 )
2(f )R(iP0;k)
2(ak )(a+b)
2 > 0
The indirect e¤ect of b on the expected welfare in a prepayment contract
will the product of the follwing three terms:
@WP0;k
@iP0;k
=
(f )(a+2b ak )
(a+ak )f+(2b+a a
k
 )
;
@R0(iP0;k)
@b
=
(f )(a+ak )
[(a+ak )f+(2b+a ak )]
2 and
@iP0;k
@R0(iP0;k)
= 1
R00(iP0;k)
So,
@WP0;k
@iP0;k
@R0(iP0;k)
@b
@iP0;k
@R0(iP0;k)
=
(f )
2
(a+2b a
k
 )(a+a
k
 )
[(a+ak )f+(2b+a ak )]
3
R00(iP0;k)
< 0
At time  the direct e¤ect is equal to zero and we have that:
@(WPF WP0;k)
@b
= 
(f )
2
ba
[(af+b]
3
R00(iP0;k)
> 0
Hence the higher b is, the more e¢cient the F-prepayment contract is as
compared to the prepayment contract, and this e¤ect tends to be intensied
towards the beginning of the contract where a is lower. If later on during the
life of the contract there is upwards updating in the trust beliefs held by the
rm, then this will reduce the superiority of such F contracts.
The opposite result will hold for a as:
@(WPF WP0;k)
@a
= 0 + b
2(f )2
(af+b)3R00(iP0;k)
< 0:

Next, we set out in detail the proofs for the four propositions referred to in
section 3.5. For  > 0; iH;k > if;k, R(iH;k) > R(if;k) we require that R0(iH;k) <
R0(if;k), which holds if:
2a bf   a
k
f > b (28)
It then follows that R
00
(iH;k) < R
00
(if;k) < 0.
We now look at the impact of parameters on investment. First we look at
the impact of  :
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@if;k
@
=
@R0(if;k)
@
R00(if;k)
=
 2b2
(ak f+b)
2
R00(if;k)
> 0
@iH;k
@
=
@R0(iH;k)
@
R00(iH;k)
=
 2b2(1 )
(2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b))
2
R00(iH;k)
> 0
2b2 > 2b2(1  ); 1
(akf+b)
2
> 1
(2a bf+(1 )(akf+b))
2
and
0 > R00(if;k) > R00(iH;k),   1
R00(if;k)
>   1
R00(iH;k)
> 0;
it follows that
@iH;k
@
<
@if;k
@
(29)
Also, for the impact on investment of renegotiation costs, f :
@if;k
@f
=
@R0(if;k)
@f
R00(if;k)
=
 2ba
(ak f+b)
2
R00(if;k)
> 0
@iH;k
@f
=
@R0(iH;k)
@f
R00(iH;k)
=
 2bak (1 )
(2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b))
2
R00(iH;k)
> 0
Hence as above,
@iH;k
@f
<
@if;k
@f
(30)
The impact of the maladaptation parameter, f is:
@if;k
@f
= 0
@iH;k
@f
=
@R0(iH;k)
@f
R00(iH;k)
=
 4a b
2
(2a bf+(1 )(af+b))2
R00(iH;k)
> 0
Therefore:
@iH;k
@f
>
@if;k
@f
= 0 (31)
The impact of b :
@if;k
@b
=
@R0(if;k)
@b
R
00 (if;k)
=
2ak f
(ak f+b)
2
R
00 (iH;k)
< 0
@iH;k
@b
=
@R0(iH;k)
@b
R
00 (iH;k)
=
2(1 )ak f
[2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b)]
2
R
00 (iH;k)
< 0
2af
(af+b)2
>
2(1 )akf
[2a bf+(1 )(akf+b)]
2
0 > R00(if;k) > R00(iH;k),   1
R00(if;k)
>   1
R00(iH;k)
> 0
 
2ak f
(af+b)2
R
00 (if;k)
>  
2(1 )ak f
[2a bf+(1 )(af+b)]2
R
00 (iH;k)
,
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0 >
@iH;k
@b
>
@if;k
@b
(32)
Also the impact of ak :
@if;k
@ak
=
@R0(if;k)
@ak
R
00 (if;k)
=
 2bf
(ak f+b)
2
R
00 (iH;k)
> 0
@iH;k
@ak
=
@R0(iH )
@ak
R
00 (iH;k)
=
 2b(1 )f
[2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b)]
2
R
00 (iH;k)
> 0
We have that,
2bf > 2b(1  )f
and,
1
(akf+b)
2
> 1
[2a bf+(1 )(akf+b)]
2
Moreover,
0 > R00(if;k) > R00(iH;k),   1
R00(if;k)
>   1
R00(iH;k)
> 0
Therefore,
 
 2bf
(ak f+b)
2
R
00 (if;k)
>  
 2b(1 )f 4b2f
[2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b)]
2
R
00 (iH;k)
,
@iH;k
@ak
<
@if;k
@ak
(33)
Finally, we examine the impact on investment on the probability or renego-
tiation, :
@if;k
@
= 0
and
@iH;k
@
=
@R0(iH;k)
@
R
00 (iH;k)
=
 2b[2a bf ak f b]
[2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b)]
2
R
00 (iH;k)
> 0
Hence,
@iH;k
@
>
@if;k
@
= 0 (34)
To derive the indirect impact of the above parameters on welfare, we rst
need to calculate the investment derivatives @W
H;k
@iH;k
and @W
f;k
@if;k
respectively.
When calculating the indirect e¤ect on expected welfare in the exible and
hybrid rigid models we impose the condition:
0 <
@WH;k
@iH;k
=
b
ak
2a (1  fb) + (1  )(a
k
f   b) 
2a bf + (1  )(akf + b)
 < @W f;k
@if;k
=
b
ak
(akf   b)
(akf + b)
(35)
For the above to hold, it su¢ces to show that:
2a (1  fb) + (1  )(a
k
f   b)

(akf + b) < 
2a bf + (1  )(a
k
f + b)

(akf   b),
2a (1  fb)(a
k
f + b) < 2a bf(a
k
f   b),
(akf + b) < bf(a
k
f   b) + fb(a
k
f + b),
(1  bf)(akf + b)  bf(a
k
f   b) < 0,
b < akf(2bf   1) (36)
If a
ak
> f , then
akf(2bf   1) < 2a bf   a
k
f:
This means that inequality (36) implies inequality (28), while if a
ak
< f ,
(28) implies (36). Remember that what has also been assumed so far is that
akf > b: Therefore, (36) can be true provided that 2bf   1 is positive and
su¢ciently close to one for the direction of the inequality to be retained.
Proof of Proposition 1
Obviously both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ect of f on welfare under a
exible contract is zero. Hence @i
H;k
@f
> @i
f;k
@f
= 0, @W
H;k
@iH
@iH;k
@f
> @W
f
@if
@if
@f
= 0:
Moreover as the direct e¤ect of f on WH;k is equal to (a   b)R(iH;k) < 0
this means that the e¢ciency of the hybrid model relative to the exible one
is eroded by the existence of a deadweight loss in the case of undertrusting. If
the negative direct e¤ect on WH;k is dominated by the positive indirect e¤ect
on WH;k, then the higher f (i.e. the lower the misalignment cost is), the more
e¢cient the hybrid contract is compared to a exible one. On the other hand,
if the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect the reverse will be the case.
However the latter is unlikely to happen for as long as f

> b
ak
> 1 as the gap in
the value of b and ak will be exceeded by the gap in the values of f and : 
For the next proposition, we shall add to the assumption akf > b; assump-
tion (28) where 2a bf  fa
k
 > b. As already mentioned, this latter inequality
assumption implies that:
iH;k > if;k;
R(iH;k) > R(if;k);
R0(iH;k) < R0(if;k);
R00(iH;k) < R00(if;k):
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Proposition 2 For akf > b; 2baf   fa
k
 > b and  > 0, the lower the
probability to renegotiate a rigid contract (the higher ); the more e¢cient a
hybrid contract compared to a exible one.
Proof. If b < 2baf   a
k
f , then
@iH;k
@
> @i
f;k
@
= 0: This means that given
(28):
@WH
@iH;k
@iH;k
@
> @W
f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@
= 0
Moreover in the hybrid contract there is a direct e¤ect of the same parameter
equal to:
[1 + f(a   b)]R(i
H;k)  
ak b
2ak
R(iH;k)  f
ak+b
2b R(i
H;k),
2R(iH;k)
4ak b
[2ak b+ 2a
k
 bf(a   b)  b(a
k
   b)  a
k
 (a
k
 + b)f ]
For the direct e¤ect to reinforce the indirect one, the former should be pos-
itive, which is the case as:
2bak > a
k
 (a
k
 + b)f + b(a
k
   b)  2a
k
 bf(a   b),
2bak > a
k
 (a
k
f + b  2bfa ) + b(a
k
f   b+ ba
k
f)
bak (1  f) + ba
k
 (1  f) + b > a
k
 (a
k
f + b  2bfa )
Given (28) akf + b   2bfa < 0, and hence the above inequality always
holds.
For the remaining two propositions, we shall start from the requirement that
the impact of investment on expected welfare in a hybrid contract is smaller that
the impact of investment on expected welfare in a exible model (0 < @W
H;k
@iH;k
<
@W f;k
@if;k
). As already shown, this requires inequality (36), which is re-written
below, to hold:
akf(2bf   1) > b()
f >
akf + b
2ak bf

>
akf + b
2ak b
=
f
2b
+

2ak
>
f + 
2

Hence inequality (36) imposes further size boundaries for f; f and . In
particular, the lower boundary for the value of f; which is an inverse measure
of the misalignment costs, becomes even more restrictive than in Proposition
2. More simply, the maladaptation costs are smaller (i.e. f is higher) than the
level needed to ensure that as the probability of renegotiation decreases, the
hybrid contract becomes more e¢cient relative to the exible one. Assuming
that af > b; (28) and (36) all hold we have the following two propositions:
Proposition 3 For 0 < @W
H;k
@iH;k
< @W
f;k
@if;k
and 0 <  < R(i
H;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
; the lower
the level of asset specicity (i.e. the higher ), the more e¢cient the exible
contract compared to the hybrid one.
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Proof. Concerning the indirect e¤ects, given that 0 < @i
H;k
@
< @i
f;k
@
,
@WH;k
@iH;k
@iH;k
@
< @W
f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@
;
if (36) and (28) both hold. As already discussed the direct e¤ect of  on
welfare is negative in both models given the introduction of a deadweight loss
if ak < b: Hence for this negative impact to be of a smaller absolute size for the
exible compared to the hybrid one, so that the above inequality is preserved,
the condition is that
(1  )R(iH;k) > R(if;k),  < R(i
H;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
The upper boundary set for  reects the requirement that the direct e¤ect
(deadweight loss) of  on welfare is (in absolute terms) smaller in the exible
contract than in hybrid one. This combined with the indirect e¤ect of  will
imply that d(W
H;k
 W f;k)
d
< 0; and therefore proposition 3 applies.
Proposition 4 For 0 < @W
H;k
@iH;k
< @W
f;k
@if;k
and  > R(i
H;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
; the lower
the renegotiation costs (i.e. the higher f); the more e¢cient a exible contract
compared to a hybrid one.
Proof. Given that 0 < @i
H;k
@f
< @i
f;k
@f
,
@WH;k
@iH;k
@iH;k
@f
< @W
f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@f
;
if (36) is satised which means that (35) holds. Therefore there is a larger
indirect e¤ect for the exible as compared to the hybrid model. This will be
strengthened by the direct e¤ect if (1 )R(iH;k) < R(if;k),  > R(i
H;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
as then @W
H;k
@f
< @W
f;k
@f
. In other words, the lower boundary for  reects the
requirement that the direct positive e¤ect of f on welfare is greater in the ex-
ible contract than in hybrid rigid one. Given this boundary, proposition 4 of
the A&S paper, that the lower the renegotiation costs (the higher f), the more
e¢cient the exible contract relative to the hybrid model (i.e. d(W
H
 W f )
df
< 0);
is reinforced under conditions of undertrusting.
The actual size of the commitment not to renegotiate matters in both propo-
sitions (3) and (4). This is once more the result of the existence of the direct
e¤ect that both parameters  and f have on welfare, but in an opposite man-
ner. As far as proposition (4) is concerned, the higher  is (the higher the
commitment not to renegotiate) the more similar the hybrid model becomes
to the pure rigid one. All other things being equal, the higher f is (the lower
renegotiation costs are), the more advantageous the exible contract is. This
result is the same as the A&S proposition (4). On the other hand, the lower 
is (the higher the probability to renegotiate), then the hybrid model becomes
increasingly similar to the exible one. Hence the latter contract loses some
of its advantage in terms of low renegotiation costs, but gains an advantage in
terms of low asset specicity terms, as it further strengthens the argument that
a exible contract is to be preferred if sunk costs are low, as proposition (3)
indicates.
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